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Abstract

Do higher levels of female labor force participation increase female political
representation? Over the past 40 years, the involvement of Latina women in the labor
force and the number of female legislators in Latin America has been steadily increasing.
To determine if there is a correlation between these two variables, this research builds on
the socio-economic status model created by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995). Using
both a bivariate and a multivariate model, I test for a correlation between the number of
women working and the number of elected female legislators in 24 Latin American
countries. Contrary to expectations, I find that increases in female labor force
participation did not increase female political representation. Instead, gender quotas
significantly impacted female representation in Latin America.

Key Words: Latin America, Female Labor Force Participation, Female Political
Representation, Gender Quotas
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Social, economic, and political disparities continue to prevent many governments
from achieving gender equality (Daley and Nolan, 1994; Ramiere, Soysal and Shananhan
1997; Cohen and Huffman, 2007). Significant disparities remain in both female labor
force participation (FLFP) and female political representation (FPR). In Latin America
and in the Caribbean, women make up 57.5 percent of the labor force but hold only 29
percent of the seats in lower or house parliaments (World Bank, 2012; IPU, 2014). 1
There is a gender gap between the female workforce participation and female political
representation.
This research examines Latin America because these countries were among the
first mandating female political participation (FPP) through national voter participation
policies and electoral quotas (Schwindt-Bayer, 2014). In order to test the relationship
between FLFP and FPR, this research employs the socioeconomic resource model (SES)
created by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995). The SES model argues that employment
provides workers with labor-related skills that can transfer into political skills. Thus,
when women join the labor force and learn labor-related skills, they can use these skills
to promote social movements and political agendas.
The data for this research came from the World Bank and International
Parliamentary Union (IPU). FPR, the dependent variable, was measured by the
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The World Bank created the proportion for FLFP in Latin America and in the Caribbean. The Interparliamentary Union determined the proportion for FPR. FPR is measured as the number of seats held by
women in lower or single house parliaments from the 24 Latin American countries included in this
research.

1

proportion of seats held by women in the national legislatures. FLFP, the independent
variable, was measured by the proportion of the female population that is economically
active.
Two statistical models were used in this research. Model 1 utilized a simple
bivariate regression model which indicated that FLFP decreases FPR. A multivariate
regression model was used in Model 2 and added gender quotas as a dummy variable.
Model 2 demonstrated that the presence of gender quotas increases FPR. Although these
findings support the null hypothesis, which shows no positive correlation between FLFP
and FPR, it does not negate the theoretical basis of this research (Brady, Verba and
Schlozman, 1995; Thornton, Alwin and Camburn, 1983; Corcoran-Nantes, 2014). My
findings were synonymous with other research which indicated that FLFP affects FPR,
electoral systems, social responsibilities, and the supply of female candidates (Banducci,
Donovan and Karp, 2004; Michael, 1985; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995).

2

Chapter 2: Literature Review
In general, the literature has examined the impact of FLFP on fertility, education,
or social norms on FPP but has not yet examined the relationship between FLFP and
FPR. FPP is defined as the political participation of the general public and can be
measured through participation in community organizations, voting, and advocacy groups
(Bowler & Segura, 2012). FPR refers to the political participation of women in local and
national governments as executives (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013). An example of
FPR would be the successful presidential election of Michelle Bachelet in 2005 (Michelle
Bachelet, 2015). The pertinent literature regarding FLFP and FPR is reviewed in three
main sections: economics, demographics, and politics. Each section will further address
the particular factors which affect FLFP and FPR.
Economics
This section will examine the three economic factors which impact FLFP. First,
FLFP can be affected as governments shift their economic development strategies from
industries which support female labor to industries that promote male labor (Ross, 2008).
Second, the effects of financial crises can heavily influence FLFP as women are accepted
into the labor force during healthy economic upturns and encouraged to leave during
economic depressions (Kim & Voos, 2011). Third, the dispersion of foreign emigrant
labor has impacted FLFP as countries with lower GDP incomes support women to
participate in cheap international labor (Pyle 2011, Fernandez-Kelly, 2011). These three
factors will now be discussed in more detail.

3

The participation of women in the economy impacts a country’s economic
development strategies since female labor is channeled into specific job sectors. Research
in oil-rich South American and Middle Eastern countries has shown that resource
discoveries (large reserve of natural resources) lead to a decrease in FLFP (Ross, 2008).
This occurs because women tend to work in the traded sector, which involves importable
goods such as agriculture and manufacturing, while men are more likely to work in the
non-traded sector, which involves non-importable goods such as construction and retail.
Economical declines have also been shown to have an impact on FLFP (Kim &
Voos, 2011). For example, the Korean financial boom of the 1990s was followed by a
financial crisis. Because of this economic downturn, wages fell and women workers were
let go as the economy of Korea adapted. Corresponding research has found that 86.2
percent of employers encouraged voluntary resignation by women (Shin, 1999). Also, the
non-labor force participation of college-educated women increased by 31.8 percent.
When FLFP supersedes male labor force participation, it does so with heavy pay
discrimination (Shin, 1999). This indicates that women were used as an economic buffer,
since their employment was encouraged during healthy economic upturns and
discouraged during economic declines. Another way in which women are used as an
economic buffer is through international emigration.
The international dispersion of workers around the globe has increased in recent
years (Fernandez-Kelly, 2011). Many governments, especially Central American
governments, with lower levels of GDP encourage female worker emigration. They
encourage female worker emigration because women are more likely to send remittances
to their country of origin (Pyle, 2011). Women have been pushed to find jobs
4

internationally to support their families as the demand for cheap labor has increased in
spite of employment and wage insecurity (Fernandez-Kelly, 2011).
Thus, it is observed that economic strategies, economic growth and decline along
with worker dispersion can impact FLFP. The literature finds that changes in these
factors can encourage and discourage FLFP depending on a country’s situation. Despite
the fact that many economic factors influence FLFP, there are other points to consider. I
will next examine the impacts of demographics on FLFP.
Demographics
Demographic factors influence FLFP in many ways including, fertility and
reproductive rights, education, social norms, and religious ideologies. A lack of
reproductive rights by women can lead to losses in their wages (IMF Staff, 2013). When
women increase their levels of education, they can compete for work in other job areas
usually reserved for educated males. Additionally, women can improve their own lives
when they do participate in the labor force, although they are widely discouraged from
doing so in many developing countries (Wolf, 2011). In regards to religious ideologies,
various religious groups approach FLFP differently (Glass & Nath, 2006; Chiswick,
1986). Indeed, cultural norms may have more to do with how society views FLFP than
religion. This section will discuss each of these topics consecutively beginning with the
impacts of fertility and reproductive rights.
The supply of female workers to the labor force is affected by fertility rates and
reproductive rights. The widespread lack of freedom in these areas can cause negative
returns for women. Research has shown that women often experience heavy income
5

losses over their lifetimes for having children (IMF Staff, 2013). Due to social
expectations, FLFP is discouraged when reproduction is controlled and monitored by
community leaders (Sen, 2011). To clarify, women in many developing countries are not
given the right to control reproduction. Rather, the head of the household, a community
leader, or the older women in the household or community determine a woman’s rate of
reproduction. It is therefore apparent that FLFP is not encouraged in countries where
reproduction is not moderated by the woman herself. However, education provides
women an avenue into the workplace.
The enrollment of girls in schools increases their literacy and social skills which
can impact their future employment (Michael, 1985). As women attain an education, they
develop organizational and networking skills and encourage changes in gender-role
attitudes (Thornton, Alwin and Camburn, 1983; Carpenter and Moore, 2014). When
female education rises, women can compete for non-manual labor jobs increasing labor
force participation (Goldin, 1995). This means that women can pursue white-collar jobs
and gain employment in the non-traded sector. Overall, when women are working outside
the home and becoming more educated, they gain job-related skills and increase their
employment opportunities (Amin, Diamond, & Naved, 1998). In spite of this, cultural
norms often deter women from every gaining an education and entering the labor force.
Although many developed countries endeavor to improve conditions for females
in the workplace, many developing countries continue to discourage women from joining
the labor force (Beneria, 2011). When women do participate in the labor force, they often
find undocumented domestic jobs as nannies or maids without legal protection (Beneria,
2011). At the same time, however, the workplace can provide women a means to improve
6

their quality of life and social status (Wolf, 2011). Poorer households are less likely than
are prosperous households to allow FLFP outside the home. Nevertheless, even
prosperous households may require a female presence within the home to fulfill domestic
responsibilities. Gender-role expectations can sometimes be attributed to religious
ideologies. Thus, it is necessary to review the impact of religious practices on FLFP.
Research has shown that religious ideologies can negatively impact FLFP
(Sherkat and Darnell, 1999; Chiswick, 1986). The more fundamentalist or traditional the
religion, the less likely women are to participate in the labor force. Scholars find that
women who adhere to strong religious pressures and are heavily involved in at-home
work tend to be less likely to enter the labor force (Glass & Nath, 2006). However, there
are variations in the levels of subscription to religious traditions, even among
fundamentalist groups. For example, except in households with young children, Jewish
women are among the highest participants of FLFP (Chiswick, 1986). It is possible
however, that variations within a religious sect may provide multiple interpretations of
traditional gender-roles. Thus, the literature shows that religion may play a role in FLFP
although there is variation even within religions.
Subsequently, the research shows that reproductive rights, education, social norms
and religion impact FLFP. The literature demonstrates that reproduction often has a
negative impact on FLFP while education has a positive impact. Research has also shown
that while some women suffer from undocumented, unregulated and gendered work,
others are free to improve their quality of life by joining the labor force. Additionally,
while more fundamentalist groups are less likely to allow women to participate in the
labor force, other religious groups may be more open to FLFP. Finally, it is important to
7

consider the impact of politics on FPR, having examined the impacts of economics and
demographics on FLFP. After reviewing the political factors influencing FPR, the SES
model can be used to correlate the impacts of FLFP on FPR.
Politics
Latin America has made significant efforts to promote FPR. In the 1960s, many
Latin American countries passed suffrage laws leading to the adoption of quota laws in
eleven countries and the introduction of women as political executives (IPU, 2005; Htun,
2005). To appreciate the impact of various political policies and institutions on FPR, it is
necessary to examine, in succession, three factors: gender quotas, party rules, and
election systems.
A gender quota refers to a seat, a position or a candidate slot that is reserved for a
female candidate. Gender quotas are used to overcome biases in electoral practices and to
avoid tokenism – one woman representing the whole. Quotas are instituted by
constitutions, legislation, or political parties. These laws do not always translate votes
into actual seats, possibly explaining why 15.8 percent of Latin American legislatures
consist of female representatives. Most states with gender quotas continue to be deficit in
regards to gender equality in the legislatures. For example, Argentina established a 30
percent female gender quota for legislative candidates maintaining a gap between the
female population of the country and female representation in the government (Htun,
2005). Nine other countries followed Argentina’s example with a minimum of 20 to 40
percent gender quota for female candidates on political party voting lists as referenced in
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Table 1. However, the effectiveness of quotas is congruently dependent on party leaders
and voters (Fox & Lawless, 1975, pp. 89-111).
Table 1. Implementation of Minimum Quotas in
the Lower House in Latin American Systems, by
Country by Year
Argentina
1991
30%
Paraguay
1996
20%
Brazil
1997
30%
Costa Rica
1997
40%
Panama
1997
30%
Peru
1997
25%
Dominican Republic
2004
25%
Ecuador
2009
20-30%
Mexico
2009
30%
Bolivia
2010
30%
Peschard, Jacqueline. 2002. The Quota System in
Latin America: General Overview. Translated by
Jacqueline Peschard. Stockholm: IDEA.

Latin American opinion polls indicate that Latino populations support gender
quotas as “generally beneficial” (Peschard, 2002; Morales Hoyos, 2001). Biased party
leadership tends to push women into “women’s wings” or feminist parties (Friedman,
2000; Caul, 1999; Htun, 2005). Mexico’s Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN, National
Action Party) has been able to maintain more female candidates than other party. The
PAN party has accomplished this by creating a lobbying process at the local and national
party levels to promote female entry into mainstream leadership positions and by
encouraging leaders to choose women as candidates (Htun, 2005). In spite of the positive
impacts of gender quotas, it has been argued that quotas alone cannot officiate FPR
(Dahlerup, 2005). Thus, in addition to gender quotas, it is crucial to create a foundational
framework to educate and train women to become competent representatives. Once
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women have been trained and recruited for public service, they then face the difficulty of
presenting themselves as viable candidates to the public. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand how female candidates are represented to the voters specifically through
substantive and symbolic representation.
Women remain underrepresented in political institutions due to problems with
substantive representation, which decreases symbolic representation (Carroll &
Sanbonmatsu, 2013). Substantive representation refers to the specific issues which
female representatives highlight in their political agendas (Lawless and Fox, 1975).
These issues often contrast with the generality of male issue interests (Gerrity, Osborn
and Morehouse Mendez, 2007). Women tend to use bill sponsorships to focus on
“women’s issues,” such as health care and education, and use broad participation and
cooperation strategies as opposed to the hierarchical approach of male representatives
(Swers 1998; Tolleson-Rinehart and Stanley, 1994). Symbolic representation refers to the
manner in which voters relate to a candidate in terms of shared physical, racial or ethnic
characteristics (Pitkin, 1967). Symbolic representation is important because it can help to
increase female voter participation (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006).
Research has shown that female representation can increase political efficacy
among women, improve female identity and promote the potential political engagement
of adolescent girls (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2006; Atkeson, 2003; Burrell, 1996;
Lawless and Fox, 1975). A rise in female representation draws attention to gender
equality issues and increase government legitimacy among women (Lawless and Fox,
1975; Mansbridge, 1999). Among minority groups, minority representation has produced
positive citizen attitudes towards the government and encouraged political participation
10

(Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 2004). In fact, descriptive representation, representation
which resembles the constituent, has been shown to increase knowledge about, and
contact with, representatives thus increasing electoral participation (Dovi, 2014;
Banducci, Donovan and Karp, 2004).
Election processes matter to FPR because women are more likely to be elected
under a system of proportional representation (PR) than under a ballot directed toward
specific candidates (Peschard, 2002). In 2000, women averaged 15 percent of
congressional members in PR systems among 182 countries: 11 percent in mixed systems
and 9 percent in plurality or majority systems (Norris, 2004). Women are more likely to
lobby for female inclusion in policymaking when a party is bureaucratic and rule-oriented
because parties can be held accountable (Matland, 2004). FPR in more institutionalized
legislatures can vary from 12 percent to 35 percent while in countries with less
institutionalized legislatures FPR remains near the regional average of 17 percent (Htun,
2005). These levels of FPR support the notion that more centralized legislative systems
increase the probability of FPR as women acquire access to the chain of influence.
From examining the political factors, the literature shows that gender quotas can
have positive impacts on FPR. Substantive representation can decrease FPR thus
decreasing symbolic representation. Moreover, party rules can increase the recruitment
and training of female candidates. Consequently, while substantive representation
negatively affects FPR, the use of a PR system can suppress a female candidate’s
platform, thereby increasing her potential to gain office.

11

In sum, the literature demonstrates the economic and demographic factors
affecting FLFP and the political factors influencing FPR. Economically, women fare
better in countries with traded economic strategies and economic success.
Demographically, fertility rates can have a negative impact on FLFP, as women are
expected to participate in domestic labor. Further, while women may become educated
and achieve employment, in instances of financial crises, they may still lose their
employment. Social and religious institutions also impact FLFP but not a significantly as
fertility, education, or cultural norms. Politically, gender quotas significantly increase
FPR; thereby increasing symbolic and descriptive representation. While symbolic
representation can support a female candidates’ platform among female voters, PR
systems, which suppress a candidate’s personal platform, can increase the likelihood of a
female candidate gaining office. To build upon this literature, this research uses the SES
model created by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) to examine the possible
relationship between FLFP and FPR.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Theory and Hypothesis
The SES model maps the impacts of resources such as time, money, and skills on
political participation (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995). The model theorizes that
those with more resources are more likely to participate in politics. For example,
individuals who work can act on their political interests and apply skills learned at work
into politics. This research expands on the SES model to examine the relationship
between FLFP and FPR. This relationship is tested by the theory that skills learned
through labor force participation positively impact political representation (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Theoretical model based on the SES model.

Labor Force
Participation

Skills

Political
Representation

By acquiring skills in the labor force, women can then use these skills for political
representation. For example, skills learned on-the-job can be used to forward the political
interests of the worker. At work, women gain access to a larger community and may be
mobilized by unions and other political institutions. When women are able to socialize
outside of the home, they can employ “civic skills” (Carpenter & Moore, 2014). Utilizing
these skills, women can act upon their political interests and begin participating
politically. Thus, employment leads to the development of skills, leading to increased
involvement of women in politics.
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An example of the SES model is demonstrated by the poor, working women of
Brazil who “strengthened their presence in non-institutional politics by protesting about
the lack of basic services, health provisions, transportation, housing and unemployment,”
(Corcoran-Nantes, 2014, p. 137). While these protests were not created for women,
women were an integral part of these protests. The organization and political practices
utilized in these protests indicates the influence of women in community mobilization.
Thus, drawing on the SES theory, my research hypothesizes that as FLFP increases, FPR
increases.
To test the hypothesis, FLFP is used as a measure of skills and FPR is measured
by the proportion of seats held by women in Latin American legislatures. The research
design involves both a bivariate regression model and a multivariate regression model.
The bivariate regression model includes two continuous variables. The dependent
variable is the proportion of female politicians in Latin America and the independent
variable is female labor force participation. The multivariate regression model adds
gender quotas as a dummy variable.
FLFP is a valid operationalization of skills because by entering the labor force,
women must have skills necessary to work (e.g. operating a machine) (Brady, Verba, &
Schlozman, 1995). Similar to Banducci, Donovan and Karp (2004), female political
representation is measured as the proportion of seats held by women in Latin American
parliaments (hereinafter referred to as legislatures).
The dummy variable was coded by the countries that mandate gender quotas
within the data population (Marx & Borner, 2011). The data for both FLFP and FPR
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come from the World Bank Databank's Gender Statistic Indicator, which has been used
by many researchers including Michael J. Ross who studied FLFP (Ross, 2008;
Psacharopoulos & Txannatos, 1989).
The data included 24 Latin American states from a list of developing countries
created by the World Bank; this population did not include Grenada or Dominica since
the World Bank did not provide FLFP data in these countries (World Bank, 2014). The
data spans ten years, from 2003 to 2013. I used two different data sources to measure
FLFP and FPR. FLFP measures the percent of economically active women from ages 15
to 64, as estimated by the International Labor Organization (ILO). FPR measures the
proportion of seats held by women in national legislatures. The World Bank compiled the
data for the proportion of seats held by women in national legislatures from data provided
by national legislatures to the IPU.
I ran two models in STATA. The first model is a bivariate regression model and
the second model was a multivariate regression model. After the data was tabulated by
year, country, and data series, the models were run in STATA (Kellstedt & Whitten,
2013). The bivariate regression model in Model 1 measured the correlation between
FLFP and FPR. Model 2, the multivariate regression model, measured the correlation
between FLFP and FPR and included gender quotas as a dummy variable.

15

Model 1:
Female Political Representation = α + βFemale Labor Force Participation + u i
Model 2:
Female Political Representation = α + β 1 Female Labor Force Participation +β 2 Gender
Quotas + u i
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, political representation, is measured by the proportion of
seats held by women in national legislatures. This proportion is expressed as a percentage
of all seats occupied by women in single or lower chambers of national legislatures, see
Figure 2. Seats refer to the number of members in the legislature. Member seats are
usually won in general elections. The average number of lower or single house seats in
Latin American legislatures are 158. 2 The average number of seats held by women is
forty-five. This leaves 113 seats for male candidates or open competition, depending on
incumbency and legislative rules. Thus, women maintain an average of 29 percent of
seats, while men maintain or compete for nearly 72 percent of seats.
Figure 2. Equation for the Proportion of Women in the Legislature
Total number of seats occupied by women
Total number of seats in the legislature

2

These numbers were derived from data provided by the IPU (IPU, 2014).
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Independent Variable
FLFP is the independent variable and is the proportion of the female population
ages 15 to 64 that is economically active: all women who supply labor for the production
of goods and services during each year (World Bank, 2012). This sample includes
women who are employed or seeking work.
Dummy Variable
The list of countries that have implemented gender quotas was compiled from
Marx and Borner, and Htun (Marx and Borner, 2011; Htun, 2005). These countries
include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru (see Table 1). Gender quotas were coded as a
dichotomous variable, where zero indicated no gender quota and one indicated the
inclusion of a gender quota.
Data Limitations
There are limitations to the World Bank data. First, the data only includes women
between the ages of 15 to 64. This is because many countries have a maximum and
minimum working age. Second, there are difficulties in measuring the number of
workers. In developing countries, the household is often the basic unit of production. Due
to seasonal work and other factors, households can experience large variations in labor
force participation. Thus, unpaid workers, family workers, students and military members
are not counted as economically active. Third, labor force surveys, which are
comprehensive, and population censuses are often used to measure labor force
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participation. However, national censuses or surveys only make limited observations;
failing to control for variations in household labor force participation over time. Fourth,
there were numerous instances of FPR excluded from the World Bank’s data. Exclusions
include, suspensions or dissolutions of legislatures; difficulties in obtaining by-election
results; replacements due to death; and institutional variations which prohibited the
candidate from carrying out the term.
Descriptive Statistics
An average FLFP of 54 percent; the lowest observation being 43 percent and the
highest observation being 68 percent. The FLFP overall median is 54 percent. St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Haiti, Jamaica, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, St. Lucia have the highest
levels of FLFP (Table 2). The data population included 258 cases of both FLFP and FPR.
Table 2. Female Labor Force Participation, Ten-Year Average by Country
80%
66%68%
64%64%
62%
61%
60%
58%
57%
57%
55%
54%
60% 55%
52%
49%
49%49%
49%48%
47%
45%
50%
43%
43%
43%
40%
70%

30%
20%
10%
0%

Total Average
Total Maximum
Total Minimum
Observations
Median

55%
55%
55%
258
54%
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The average level of FPR in the sample is 19 percent with the lowest average in
Belize, 3 percent, and the highest average in Cuba, 41 percent, and an overall median of
18 percent. Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Mexico, Guyana, Argentina, Costa Rica,
and Cuba have above average FPR rates ranging from 21 to 41 percent (Table 3).

Table 3. Female Political Representation, Ten-Year Average by Country
45%
41%
37%
40%
33%
35%
29%
27%25%
26%
30%
24%
25%
21%
19%
18%19%
18%
17%
16%
20%
13%
12%12%
12%
15%
11%
11%
9%
10%
4%
3%
5%
0%

Total Average
Total Maximum
Total Minimum
Cases
Median

19%
41%
3%
258
18%

The average FPR in the countries implementing gender quotas is 22 percent with
a deviation ranging from 20 to 40 percent. The median value for FPR is 21 percent. The
average FLFP for these countries is 56 percent with a deviation ranging from 41 to 69
percent. The median value for FLFP is 56 percent.
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Chapter 4: Results
The percent of variation explained by Model 1 in the dependent variable is only 7
percent (R2 = 0.07) while Model 2 accounts for 13 percent of the variation in the
dependent variable (R2 = 0.1319). Therefore, gender quotas have a greater impact on FPR
and account for more variation than does FLFP on FPR. This is logical since I find a
slightly lower root mean squared error (Root MSE) in Model 2 (Root MSE = 10.158)
than Model 1 (Root MSE = 10.158).
The data shows that the average representation of women is 40.67 percent, and
that female labor has a negative impact on FPR (-.39) (Table 4). As the percentage of
FLFP increases, the level of FPR in Latin American countries decreases. When
controlling for gender quotas, the average FPR slightly increases to 43.37 percent. FLFP
continues to have a negative impact on FPR (-49). However, gender quotas have a
positive impact on FPR (5.60). This data shows that there is a 5.60 percent increase in
women’s representation when there is a gender quota. Thus, due to statistical
conclusions, this research accepts the null hypothesis, which states that FLFP does not
cause an increase in FPR. Instead, it appears that quotas significantly impact female
representation in Latin America.
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Table 4. Female Political Representation (2003-year)
Independent Variable
Labor Force Participation

Quotas

Model 1
-0.39***

Model 2
-0.49***

(0.08)

0.84

__

5.60***
(1.32)

Intercept
R2

40.67
.08

43.37
.12

N
258
258
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-tests: ***indicates p<.01;
**indicates < .05; *indicates p < .10.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Discussion
These results conclude that FLFP actually has a negative impact on FPR, even
when controlling for quotas. Although the SES model theorizes that skills, and not labor
force participation, can lead to political participation, other research has shown that labor
force participation can impact political participation and consequently representation
(Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Thornton, Alwin and Camburn, 1983; CorcoranNantes, 2014). Furthermore, the research by Corcoran-Nantes maintains validity since
through education, health care and political support a woman can become politically
active (Corcoran-Nantes, 2014; Goldin, 1995; Amin, Diamond and Naved, 1998; Fox and
Lawless, 1975). While social and demographic factors may greatly impact FPR, FLFP
continues to have an impact, although slight, on FPR (Banducci, Donovan and Karp,
2004; Michael, 1985; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995). Thus, this research
contributes to the SES model and other research in this area.
The results of Model 2 demonstrate that the impact of gender quotas supersedes
the impact of FLFP on FPR. Gender quotas, as a variable, account for more variation than
does FLFP and correlates more strongly with FPR. However, while these results are
intriguing, quotas are not enough to maintain FPR since implementation varies and
women must be qualified and capable of holding office (Dahlerup 2005; Bhavnani 2009).
Iversen and Rosenbluth examined the connection between FLFP and FPR and
emphasized the necessity of women achieving seniority in the political system (Iversen &
Rosenbluth, 2008). They found that the social responsibilities placed on female
politicians are disruptive to their ability to attain seniority. The work of Iversen and
Rosenbluth is supported by others who highlight the issue of supply. A candidate must
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have the ambition, skills and knowledge necessary to campaign and win an election;
however, the achievement is difficult when social and demographic factors deter women
from fulfilling all of these requirements (Paxton, Kinovich, & Hughes, 2007). Together,
these observations support the idea that gender quotas are not sufficient to maintain FPR.
While this research accepts the null hypothesis, these findings measure one aspect
of the SES model and do not nullify the relationship between FLFP and FPR since other
research maintains this relationship. Future research may be able to identify a better
measure of skills to improve the correlation between FLFP and FPR.
Future Research
Future research should include the political participation of female citizens instead
of focusing on candidates and representatives. It is possible that women become
politically active when they enter the labor force; however, it is likely that their political
participation is more localized. Thus, surveys should measure various forms of political
participation, such as, participation in local advocacy groups. For example, looking at the
participation of women on school boards or in churches may help to inform the
relationship between FLFP and FPP and capture the moment when women become
politically active.
Other possibilities for future research include controlling for the long-term
impacts of gender quotas and case studies. The long-term influences of gender quotas
should be included in future research since changes in regulations can change the
adherence to and support for gender quotas (Bhavnani, 2009). Also, research involving a
single country or a small range of countries – such as, Mexico, Costa Rica and Cuba –
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will help to better inform our current knowledge of FPP and may help to explain the
deviation between states (Peschard, 2002).
As indicated by Professor Mark Jones, Latin America is undergoing many
political changes and is likely to see “an increasingly diverse set of democracies and
democratic experiences coexisting in the region” (Jones, 2012). These changes will
provide students of Latin America a unique opportunity for research. With the increase in
worker emigration, it is important for scholars to examine the advantages and
disadvantages of the international job market. The success of gender quotas has
encouraged researchers to develop means of transferring these models to other countries,
such as India (Bhavnani, 2009). Therefore, future analysis on the influences of female
labor participation, female political participation, and female political representation in
Latin America may inform gender politics well into the future. The acceptance of female
politicians in Latin America may help to better inform the political positions of the
neighboring states and improve gender relations in the region.
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